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ABSTRACT—The Clean Air Act is often heralded as a paragon of
cooperative federalism. The Act’s approach to vehicle emissions regulation
in particular prescribes a unique partnership between the federal government
and the state of California: while all states are bound by federally mandated
vehicle emissions requirements, California may set more stringent standards
in recognition of its historic role on the leading edge of environmental
protection. However, in August 2018, the Environmental Protection Agency
proposed not only to roll back the national emissions regulations, but also to
revoke California’s ability to set more stringent standards, which include
limits on greenhouse gas emissions and zero-emissions vehicle mandates.
This revocation, finalized in September 2019, sparked legal challenges and
debate on the role of states in environmental protection.
The Supreme Court’s recent expansion of the anticommandeering
doctrine in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association may signal
increased constraints on federal power over states, which in turn may shed
light on the permissibility of the EPA’s action to revoke California’s
enhanced regulatory ability. This Note assesses the impact of Murphy on the
distinction between permissible preemption and impermissible
commandeering of state regulation, then applies that distinction to the
vehicle emissions context. Ultimately, this Note argues that Congress and
the courts should recognize the value of state involvement in environmental
regulation and be wary of discarding the current dual-regulator system for
vehicle emissions, owing to both policy and federalism concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
In the midst of World War II, residents of Los Angeles awoke one
morning in July 1943 to a thick, eye-watering, and nose-burning fog, and
initially believed it to be a Japanese chemical attack. 1 It would take nearly a
decade for scientists to discover that the culprit was actually automobile
traffic, worsened by the heavy population influx to Los Angeles during the
war. 2 Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit, a chemist and professor at the California
Institute of Technology, published the first study linking vehicle emissions
and smog in 1950, which prompted California to pass the first vehicle
emissions standards in the nation in 1961. 3
When Congress enacted the first federal legislation concerning vehicle
emissions in 1967, it acknowledged California’s pioneering efforts and
1 CHIP JACOBS & WILLIAM J. KELLY, SMOGTOWN: THE LUNG-BURNING HISTORY OF POLLUTION IN
LOS ANGELES 13–14 (2008).
2 Id. at 30–31, 86–87; David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism when Numbers Matter More
than Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 252 (2014) (noting that by the end of the 1940s, Los
Angeles had 50% more vehicles than New York City).
3 Adelman, supra note 2, at 252–53; see also A. J. Haagen-Smit, Chemistry and Physiology of Los
Angeles Smog, 44 INDUS. & ENG’G CHEMISTRY 1342 (1952); A. J. Haagen-Smit, The Air Pollution
Problem in Los Angeles, 14 ENG’G & SCI. 7 (1950).
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established a waiver provision that could exempt California’s more stringent
air pollution standards from otherwise being preempted by the federal
regulations. 4 Ever since then, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has granted waivers to California that permit stronger state regulation. 5 But
in August 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to freeze federal
emissions standards and revoke the preemption waiver, valid through 2025,
that permits California, and other states derivatively, 6 to set higher emissions
standards than the federal requirement. 7 In September 2019, the
Administration published part one of this Rule in final form, which revokes
California’s preemption waiver effective November 2019 and adds
regulatory text making it explicit that California’s standards are henceforth
preempted. 8
This “Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule” has faced
criticism along several fronts: environmental advocates have argued that the
rollback threatens public health, air quality, and the environment; 9

4 See Jeffrey Fromson, A History of Federal Air Pollution Control, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 516, 535–36
(1969) (noting that California advocated to maintain its standards both because its smog problem
warranted special attention and because strict federal preemption conflicted with the principle that states
bore primary responsibility over air pollution). Much like the Clean Air Act does today, the Air Quality
Act of 1967 permitted the implementing agency to waive the preemption of state regulation for any state
that had adopted vehicle emissions limits prior to March 30, 1966—which only California had done, and
thus, only California qualified for the waiver. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, §§ 208(a)–
(b), 81 Stat. 485, 500; Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 281, 292–93 (2003); see also infra Part II.A.
5 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 568 (7th
ed. 2013). The EPA has never fully denied a waiver, but it has delayed a decision, occasionally partly
denied a waiver, and once rejected a waiver, but later withdrew the rejection and granted the waiver. See
Vicki Arroyo et al., New Strategies for Reducing Transportation Emissions and Preparing for Climate
Impacts, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919, 924 n.21 (2017); Carlson, supra note 4, at 293.
6 Per a 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act, any state is permitted to adopt California’s emissions
limits in place of the federal standards. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 177,
91 Stat. 685, 750; see also infra notes 163–166 and accompanying text.
7 SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986, 42999 (Aug. 24, 2018); see also NHTSA and EPA Proposed SAFE
Vehicle Rule Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100V26O.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASW5-L4Y8].
8
SAFE Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). The Administration split the SAFE Rule into two parts: Part One, the One
National Program, withdraws California’s waiver and adds regulatory text clarifying that state programs
limiting vehicle emissions are preempted; as of October 2019, Part Two, which sets new federal emissions
standards, will be published as a final rule “in the near future.” Id. at 51310. Specifically, this Final Rule
revokes a waiver that EPA granted to California in 2013 which permitted California’s more stringent
standards under the state’s greenhouse gas emissions program and zero-emissions vehicle mandate. Id.;
see also infra notes 180, 190 and accompanying text.
9 See Kate Larsen et al., Sizing Up a Potential Fuel Economy Standards Freeze, RHODIUM
GRP. (May 3, 2018), https://rhg.com/research/sizing-up-a-potential-fuel-economy-standards-freeze/
[https://perma.cc/4FKR-TJRU].
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economists have asserted that the Rule will be costly to consumers 10 and that
its cost–benefit analysis is flawed, with dubious calculations and
unsupported assumptions; 11 and the automobile industry has cautioned that
the SAFE Rule threatens jobs and increases regulatory uncertainty. 12 In
addition, a coalition of states has brought two rounds of legal action to
invalidate the SAFE Rule, first challenging the draft rule in May 2018 13 and
second challenging the Final Rule in September 2019. 14 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed the first petitions for review
of the draft rule, concluding that the EPA’s draft rule did not constitute
judicially reviewable “final action.” 15 The second suit, however, which
alleges that part one of the Final Rule (revoking California’s waiver) violates
rulemaking procedures and exceeds agency authority, has just begun. 16
Beyond the legal and policy debate, the revocation of California’s
preemption waiver forces a broader conversation about the role of states in
environmental protection. Should the federal government deny California its
ability to innovate and set standards that more closely match the desires of
its constituency—a privilege the state has enjoyed for the last fifty years?
Alternatively, should California be allowed to act on equal footing with the
10 Trevor Houser et al., The Biggest Climate Rollback Yet?, RHODIUM GRP. (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://rhg.com/research/the-biggest-climate-rollback-yet/ [https://perma.cc/6UHQ-H2UU] (projecting
that freezing standards will cost consumers an additional $193 billion to $236 billion between now and
2035 in oil costs); see also TYLER COMINGS ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., FUELING SAVINGS:
HIGHER FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS RESULT IN BIG SAVINGS FOR CONSUMERS 3 (2016), https://
advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Fueling-Savings-Consumer-Savings-fromCAFE-2025-Final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFW5-DLFL] (estimating savings of at least $3,200 per
vehicle that complies with the heightened emissions standards the Administration proposes to revoke).
11 See, e.g., BETHANY DAVIS NOLL ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, ANALYZING
EPA’S VEHICLE-EMISSIONS DECISIONS: WHY WITHDRAWING THE 2022–2025 STANDARDS IS
ECONOMICALLY FLAWED 5–6 (2018), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Analyzing_EPAs_
Fuel-Efficiency_Decisions_Policy_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/27A3-MH8A]; Antonio M. Bento et al.,
Flawed Analyses of U.S. Auto Fuel Economy Standards, 362 SCI. 1119, 1119–20 (2018).
12 See, e.g., Timothy Cama, Automakers Fight Trump’s Auto Emissions Rollback, HILL (Oct. 29,
2018, 5:21 P.M.), https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/automobiles/413729-automakers-fighttrumps-auto-emissions-rollback [https://perma.cc/TRR5-5JU7] (describing how major automakers filed
comments expressing concern that the Rule is detrimental to consumers, society and American
competitiveness and invites litigation and regulatory uncertainty); Brian Palmer, Fuel Efficiency
Standards Don’t Just Help Curb Climate Change, They Also Create Jobs, NRDC (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fuel-efficiency-standards-dont-just-help-curb-climate-change-they-alsocreate-jobs [https://perma.cc/KA3M-BNNM] (showing that by the Administration’s own estimates, the
SAFE Rule will cost the economy nearly sixty thousand jobs by 2030).
13 California v. EPA, 940 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
14 Complaint, California v. Chao, No. 19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019).
15
California, 940 F.3d, at 1353. If an agency action is not “final,” federal courts lack jurisdiction to
hear an administrative challenge. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 873 F.3d
946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
16
Complaint, California v. Chao, supra note 14.
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EPA and require national manufacturers to comply with a more stringent
state-specific requirement? Scholars have debated the normative arguments
in favor of and against greater state autonomy in environmental regulation. 17
But the withdrawal of California’s unique waiver also raises constitutional
questions and federalism concerns, particularly in light of the Court’s recent
anticommandeering jurisprudence. As of October 2019, however, no one has
considered whether the revocation is an affront to federalism and to the
anticommandeering principle in particular. 18
The Clean Air Act directs the EPA to set national vehicle emissions
standards and expressly prohibits any state regulation of vehicle emissions, 19
thereby setting both a floor and a ceiling (a form of preemption dubbed
“unitary federal choice”). 20 Yet the Act contains a waiver of preemption
directed at California alone, which allows the state to set more stringent
emissions standards, thereby imposing only a regulatory floor, and no
ceiling, in that state. 21
At the time of the Act’s passage in 1970, the inclusion of a waiver was
driven by a recognition of California’s unique challenges and pioneering
efforts on vehicular air pollution rather than by any constitutional or
federalism concerns. 22 Since then, however, the Supreme Court has
increasingly recognized the Tenth Amendment as a check on federal power
and has refined the anticommandeering doctrine, under which Congress may
not commandeer state legislative or administrative functions. 23 While
17

See infra Part III.C.
Although the American Constitution Society has noted in a policy brief that the waiver revocation
contradicts federalism principles, the authors did not discuss the Court’s federalism jurisprudence or the
anticommandeering rule. ANN E. CARLSON ET AL., AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, SHIFTING GEARS: THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S REVERSAL ON CALIFORNIA’S CLEAN AIR ACT WAIVER 7–11 (2019),
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CA-Car-Standards-IB-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LTJ-HLGM].
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a)(1), 7543(a) (2012).
20 Coined by Professor William Buzbee, “unitary federal choice” describes forms of ceiling
preemption that completely displace any other regulatory actors. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1568–69
(2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Asymmetrial Regulation]; William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise:
Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 147 (2007)
[hereinafter Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise]; see also infra Part I.B.
21 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). California is the only state that qualifies for a waiver. See supra note 4; see
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 525
(2d Cir. 1994) (describing history of the Clean Air Act and how “California was excepted from
preemption as the only state regulating auto emissions ‘prior to March 30, 1966’”).
22 Deborah Keeth, The California Climate Law: A State’s Cutting-Edge Efforts to Achieve Clean Air,
30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 715, 723 (2003); see also James R. May, Of Happy Incidents, Climate, Federalism,
and Preemption, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 465, 482 (2008).
23 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
18
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limiting Congress’s ability to regulate state governments directly, the Court
nonetheless recognized that Congress could accomplish similar ends through
preemption, wherein Congress directly regulates private actors and preempts
contrary state law. 24 Under this dichotomy, valid preemptive schemes merely
instructed states to forbear from acting, while laws that affirmatively
instructed states to act were invalid as forms of commandeering. 25
The division between preemption and commandeering continued
undisturbed until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Murphy v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association in May 2018. 26 In Murphy, the Court clarified
that the anticommandeering doctrine is implicated not only when Congress
affirmatively commands that states enact legislation or adopt federal
programs, but also when Congress prohibits states from enacting laws. “[I]n
either event,” wrote Justice Alito for the majority, “[t]he basic principle—
that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies.” 27
Thus, in its attempt to clarify the anticommandeering doctrine, Murphy may
have blurred the line between valid federal preemption and unconstitutional
commandeering.
Environmental regulations like the Clean Air Act involve complex
cooperative federalism programs that reach deep into local policy and
therefore must navigate through a maze of commandeering prohibitions and
available preemption alternatives. 28 Depending on how Murphy shifts the
line between preemption and commandeering, the case may bear on the

24

See New York, 505 U.S. at 166–68.
See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1054 (1995) (stating that the
commandeering analysis “rests on an action/inaction distinction,” in which “Congress may compel state
inaction by limiting the subject matters over which states can regulate, yet Congress may not compel any
affirmative regulatory action within the remaining realm of state authority”); see also Neil S. Siegel,
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1639–40
(2006).
26 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
27 Id. at 1478.
28 Cooperative federalism describes a “system of shared authority between the federal and state
governments” to regulate private activity. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1811
(2008); see also Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD.
L. REV. 1516, 1532–33 (1995) (“Cooperative federalism holds the promise of allowing the states
continued primacy and flexibility in their traditional realms of protecting public health and welfare, while
ensuring that protections for all citizens meet minimum federal standards. In theory, the system allows
states to experiment and innovate, but not to sacrifice public health and welfare in a bidding war to attract
industry.”).
25
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validity of the EPA’s revocation of California’s ability to set more stringent
emissions standards—a power that California insists on maintaining. 29
This Note analyzes the line between commandeering and preemption
after Murphy and examines how the current caselaw affects the Clean Air
Act’s ceiling preemption and the California waiver. Ultimately, this review
concludes that the revocation of California’s waiver does not implicate the
anticommandeering doctrine under the most straightforward reading of
Murphy. However, this Note critiques Murphy’s clarified distinction
between preemption and commandeering as overly formalistic and too
imprecise an instrument to account for complex cooperative federalism
schemes like the vehicle emissions program. In any case, there are strong
normative arguments for maintaining state participation in vehicle emissions
regulation, particularly at a time when reducing greenhouse gas emissions is
critical 30 and the EPA has been unwilling and unable to act sufficiently to
address the problem. 31
29 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS 2–3 (2018),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2018/leviii2018/leviiiisor.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W85-X95A] (noting
California’s pressing “responsibilities as an independent co-regulator” for one third of the domestic lightduty vehicle industry and proposing amendments that “will prevent any federal weakening” from
impacting California through 2025).
30 Greenhouse gases (GHGs), which include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated
gases, trap heat in the atmosphere by absorbing outgoing thermal radiation that would otherwise escape
back into space, warming the planet. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/49X4-J5R6]. These gases have increased
significantly in concentration—by approximately 44%—since the Industrial Revolution as a result of
fossil fuel combustion for energy. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS,
at ES-9–ES-10 (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/documents/2018_complete_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JDV-NQ5Q]. Nearly one-fifth of the GHG emissions in the United States
come from fueling passenger cars and light-duty trucks, which emit twenty-four pounds of GHGs for
every gallon of gasoline. Car Emissions & Global Warming, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://
www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/car-emissions-and-global-warming [https://perma.cc/N466-9R5B]; see
also Vehicle Efficiency and Emissions Standards, ENVTL. & ENERGY STUDY INST. (Aug. 2015),
https://www.eesi.org/files/FactSheet_Vehicle_Emissions_081815.pdf [https://perma.cc/B65X-AQS7].
A recent report by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change found that the
globe will unavoidably warm 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2040, causing frightening and dangerous
consequences for food security, the prevalence and intensity of natural disasters, and ecosystem integrity.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 10–11 (2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SYA-AFUL]. To limit warming beyond 1.5 degrees will require global anthropogenic
carbon dioxide emissions to fall 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 and achieve net zero by around 2050,
which is unachievable without “rapid and far reaching transitions” in areas including transport, such as
reducing vehicle emissions. See id. at 15, 17.
31 See Elizabeth Bomberg, Environmental Politics in the Trump Era: An Early Assessment,
26 ENVTL. POL. 956, 956–57 (2017) (discussing the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle
environmental protection policies); Carlson, supra note 4, at 311 (noting California’s critical role in
reducing emissions due to inaction at the federal level); Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA,
64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2012) (concluding that the EPA delayed, cut back, and stagnated on its

1021

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the doctrines of
anticommandeering and preemption, discusses the reasoning in Murphy, and
analyzes how Murphy impacts the anticommandeering and preemption
doctrines. Part II describes the regulatory landscape governing vehicle
emissions, including the Clean Air Act, California’s unique position, and the
Trump Administration’s SAFE Rule. With the preceding Parts as a
foundation, Part III applies the principles from Murphy to the Clean Air
Act’s preemption of state regulation and the California waiver and uses the
current federal and state struggle over vehicle emissions regulation to
examine whether Murphy’s distinction between preemption and
commandeering is coherent. Lastly, Part III concludes with an argument for
preserving California’s function as a laboratory of innovation.
I.

ANTICOMMANDEERING, PREEMPTION, AND MURPHY

Both the anticommandeering and preemption doctrines shape the
division of power between federal and state governments. Traditionally, the
anticommandeering doctrine prevented Congress from requiring state
legislatures or executives to affirmatively act according to federal
instruction. Preemption, on the other hand, was Congress’s permissible way
of completely eliminating state legislative authority in areas where Congress
had chosen to act exclusively. Then, in 2018, the Supreme Court in Murphy
stated that both doctrines—anticommandeering and preemption—govern the
boundaries of permissible laws when Congress prohibits states from
legislating in certain areas. This Part will introduce the two doctrines,
describe Murphy’s ruling, and assess how Murphy impacts the difference
between preemption and commandeering.
A. Anticommandeering: Federal Power May Not Compel State Action
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution reminds Congress that its
powers are limited and serves as a textual basis to invalidate federal laws that
invade “the province of state sovereignty.” 32 The Articles of Confederation
taught the Framers that “using the States as the instruments of federal
governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict,”
and “[p]reservation of the States as independent political entities [became]

regulatory initiatives on greenhouse gases). See generally Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously:
Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 301
(1999) (discussing agency failures to act in environmental regulation broadly).
32 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
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the price of union.” 33 In response, the Constitution established a system of
dual sovereignty, where federal and state governments exercise concurrent
authority to regulate individuals, but Congress may neither regulate states
directly nor instruct states how to govern. 34 This system ensures that the
federal and state political capacities are “each protected from incursion by
the other,” and that each has “its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it.” 35
To monitor this careful balance, courts assess whether the enactment of
federal laws exceeds Congress’s powers under Article I of the Constitution
and encroaches on a protected area of state sovereignty. 36 While the
prevalence of the Tenth Amendment as a limit has varied over time, the
underlying aims of invoking it remain fairly consistent: protecting the
structure of federalism, maintaining state sovereign rights and traditional
functions, ensuring political accountability, safeguarding individual and
political liberties, and permitting states to act as laboratories of democracy. 37
Judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment to constrain Congress
has ebbed and flowed over time. In 1976, the Supreme Court broke forty
years of upholding economic legislation against claims of encroachment into
state sovereignty when it struck down provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act in National League of Cities v. Usery. 38 The Court held that while
Congress could set minimum wage and maximum hour limits for private
employers, it could not regulate states as public employers, for this amounted
to direct federal regulation of states as sovereign governments. 39 The Tenth
Amendment, the Court ruled, protected states’ “traditional governmental
functions” from federal encroachment, and prohibited federal regulations
that addressed matters involving indisputable “attribute[s] of state
sovereignty.” 40

33 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
34 See New York, 505 U.S. at 161–66 (discussing the history of the anticommandeering doctrine).
35 Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
36 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (finding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
exceeded Congress’s legislative authority). Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to
legislate for certain limited purposes. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 237–342 (4th ed. 2011).
37 See Siegel, supra note 25, at 1642–45, 1649–50.
38 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
39 Id. at 852.
40 Id. at 845, 852.
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The question of what this ruling meant for federal and state cooperation
on environmental regulation arose immediately. Prior to the Court’s
pronouncement in National League of Cities, four states had filed lawsuits
challenging EPA regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act that
required states to pass and enforce certain laws on pollution control when the
states failed to submit adequate plans on their own.41 Various circuits struck
down the regulations on statutory grounds for exceeding the EPA
Administrator’s mandate in the Clean Air Act, but also noted that if the
Administrator did indeed have such power, it would contravene the Tenth
Amendment by impermissibly infringing on state sovereignty. 42 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the consolidated cases in 1977
after National League of Cities, but by then, the EPA Administrator
conceded that the regulations would be invalid unless they eliminated the
mandate that states adopt certain laws.43 Accordingly, the Court vacated the
lower judgments but declined to prospectively rule on the constitutionality
of the EPA’s yet-to-be-promulgated revised regulations. 44 Thus, the Court
did not answer whether the Tenth Amendment would be as protective of state
sovereignty in environmental regulation as it was in labor regulation.
The Court backtracked in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, overruling National League of Cities after finding that it was too
unworkable for courts to determine what constituted a “traditional
governmental function” of state and local governments that the federal
government could not touch. 45 Instead, the Court advised that state interests
were better protected by procedural safeguards in the structure of the federal
system itself than by judicially created limits. 46
While Garcia is still good law, the Court in the 1990s returned to
federalism constraints in the Tenth Amendment via the anticommandeering
41

These cases were Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th
Cir. 1975), Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), and Virginia ex rel. State Air Pollution
Control Board v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and were all vacated by EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S.
99 (1977). For further information on these cases and how scholars of the day predicted National League
of Cities would impact them, see Arlan Gerald Wine, Enforcement Controversy Under the Clean Air Act:
State Sovereignty and the Commerce Clause, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 383, 383–84, 397–400 (1976).
42 Wine, supra note 41, at 383, 387–88, 392–94 (citations omitted).
43 Brown, 431 U.S. at 103.
44 Id. at 103–04.
45 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (“[T]he attempt to draw the
boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very
federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest.”).
46 Id. at 552. The Court pointed to the equal representation of states in the Senate and states’ influence
over the Presidency and House of Representatives by controlling electoral qualifications as examples of
how the federal structure itself protected state interests. Id. at 550–52.
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doctrine in what has been called a “federalist revival.” 47 The
anticommandeering doctrine represents the principle that the federal
government may not command state legislatures to enact laws or regulations,
nor may it command state executive officials to administer federal
programs. 48
In New York v. United States, the Court invalidated a federal provision
that required state governments to either take title to radioactive waste or
regulate it pursuant to Congress’s instructions. 49 The Court reasoned that
either option “would ‘commandeer’ state governments into the service of
federal regulatory purposes,” and therefore, the provision impermissibly
intruded across the “constitutional line separating state and federal
authority.” 50 Importantly, however, the Court noted that the Constitution
permitted Congress to achieve similar ends through preemption or by
offering states incentives to encourage voluntary cooperation. 51
If New York stood for the rule that Congress may not commandeer a
state’s legislative process, the Court’s next anticommandeering case, Printz
v. United States, ruled that Congress may not “circumvent that prohibition”
by commandeering state officials directly. 52 The provision of the act at issue
required state law enforcement officials to conduct background checks for a
federal handgun program. This amounted to federal conscription of state
officials to administer a federal regulatory scheme, which violated state
sovereignty and dual federalism. 53 As the Court stated, “[i]t is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends.” 54
In sum, the anticommandeering doctrine grew to represent the principle
that the Tenth Amendment protects some sphere of state sovereignty and
47

Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 2180, 2181 (1998) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995); and New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) as evidence that the “constitutional law of federalism-based constraints on
the federal government has risen phoenix-like from the ashes of post-New Deal enthusiasm for the
exercise of national power”).
48 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
49 New York, 505 U.S. at 175–76 .
50 Id. at 175, 177.
51 Id. at 188.
52 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
53 Id. at 922–23. Dual federalism describes the theory that the federal government and state
governments both have sovereign power over citizens, with separate and distinct spheres of authority. See
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 252–53 (explaining dual federalism and the three doctrines it
embodies). But see Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2133, 2133–35 (2006) (arguing that the U.S. government does not actually operate on the theory
of dual federalism; rather, “overlap of national and state activities is ubiquitous”).
54 Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.
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prohibits the federal government from commanding affirmative action by
state legislatures or executives.
B. Preemption: Federal Power May Prohibit Contrary State Policy
While Congress may not affirmatively commandeer states, it can pass
federal statutes per Article I of the Constitution and include provisions that
bar states from enacting conflicting laws—referred to as preemption of state
legislation. 55 Thus far, the Court has treated preemption as an entirely
permissible alternative to commandeering, allowing Congress to respond to
invalidated commandeering legislation with broader preemptive schemes. 56
This Section introduces the constitutional basis for preemption and the
various forms it can take.
The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause, 57 which
instructs that when courts are faced with a conflict between a valid federal
law and a contrary state or local law, federal law shall prevail.58 The
preemption power is a derivative of the supremacy of federal law, permitting
Congress to anticipatorily prohibit state or local laws that would be at odds
with valid exercises of federal power.59
In a preemption analysis, the primary question is whether Congress in
fact intended to exercise its preemptive power. 60 The Court has recognized
three primary ways in which Congress can demonstrate its intent to
preempt—express, conflict, and field preemption—but all three involve
incompatibility between state and federal law.61
“Express preemption” occurs when a federal law contains an explicit
provision that withdraws certain authority from states. 62 The Court has noted
55

U.S. CONST. art. I; see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
767, 771 (1994); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 237–342 (providing a primer on Congress’s
legislative powers under Article I).
56 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1646–47.
57 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152
(1982).
58 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000).
59 See id. at 251–52 (“Under the Supremacy Clause, any obligation to disregard state law flows
entirely from the obligation to follow federal law.”); see also Gardbaum, supra note 55, at 771 (“Whereas
supremacy resolves a conflict resulting from the exercise by two or more entities of their concurrent
powers, preemption implies that one entity (the federal) has attained exclusive power on the issue.”).
60 See Gardbaum, supra note 55, at 767.
61 The Court has, at times, defined these categories with rigidity, see, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990), but scholars have critiqued the Court as being unable to maintain clear
distinctions. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1177 (3d ed. 2000); Nelson,
supra note 58, at 262. Recently the Court has agreed. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (“Our cases have identified three different types of preemption—‘conflict,’
‘express,’ and ‘field’ []—but all of them work in the same way.”).
62 Nelson, supra note 58, at 226.
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that Congress need not use special words when drafting a preemption
provision—all that matters is Congress’s intent to preempt. 63 But the Court
has also articulated a broad presumption against preemption and favored a
narrow reading of express preemption provisions, particularly those that
involve the states’ traditional powers over health, safety, and welfare.64
When applying a statute’s express preemption provision, courts consider
(a) the statutory meaning and whether it covers the state action at issue and
(b) whether the Constitution permits Congress to preempt states in such a
manner. 65
Even in the absence of an express preemption provision, state law is
preempted if it actually conflicts with a federal law; this is labeled “conflict
preemption.” Conflict preemption can arise when it is impossible to comply
with both federal and state laws, or when state law “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” 66
Finally, courts find “field preemption” in two situations: first, when a
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive that courts reasonably infer that
Congress left “no room for supplementary state legislation”; 67 and second,
when the federal law addresses “a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject.” 68 Even in field and conflict preemption,
courts must still consider (a) the scope of the implicit preemption and (b)
whether Congress may constitutionally exercise such power.69
Not all preemption schemes completely displace state action; some
forms permit state regulatory participation. First, under “conditional
preemption,” states are given a choice to either pass state regulations
according to federal directives (a clear case of commandeering on its own)
or to be preempted outright by federal laws. 70 While Congress may not
directly commandeer the states, it can condition its decision to not fully
preempt state laws upon securing the states’ agreement to be

63

Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1199 (2017).
See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
65 Nelson, supra note 58, at 226–27.
66 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1983) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
67 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cty., 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986).
68 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
69 Nelson, supra note 58, at 227.
70 Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 663, 668 (2001).
64
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commandeered. 71 By offering states a choice between preemption or
commandeering as part of a program of cooperative federalism, Congress
escapes the commandeering prohibition. 72
Alternatively, many preemption schemes in the regulatory context set
only a floor or a ceiling, permitting states to regulate so long as the state
regulation fits within that federally mandated range. 73 In “floor preemption,”
Congress sets a federal minimum, and preempts state regulations that fall
below it. 74 Many environmental laws follow this model of cooperative
federalism by permitting states to tailor their environmental standards to
local needs with more stringent requirements, as long as the federal
minimum is met. 75 For example, the Clean Water Act directs the EPA to
establish federal standards for acceptable levels of pollution, but sets only
the minimum level of stringency. 76 States may adopt additional pollution
standards that are not “less stringent” than the federal standards. 77
Conversely, when Congress sets a standard and prohibits states from
applying more stringent regulation, it imposes “ceiling preemption.” 78 This
often takes the form of a unitary federal choice, which sets both a floor and
ceiling and traditionally was used primarily in product design and
engineering standards. 79 For example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act sets federal product labeling requirements and prohibits
states from imposing any additional label requirements that go beyond the
federal mandate. 80 As another example, the Court has struck down state laws
71

Siegel, supra note 25, at 1676.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has the authority
to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer
States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted
by federal regulation.”).
73 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1630 n.2.
74 Id. at 1678.
75 Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation,
90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 384 (2005); see also Babich, supra note 28, at 1534 (“The essence of cooperative
federalism is that states take primary responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining
the freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards.”).
76 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(3) (2012); see also Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1567.
77 33 U.S.C. § 1370; see also Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1567. Similar
provisions exist in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012), and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, id. §§ 6926(b), 6929.
78 Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1569.
79 See id. at 1568; Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise, supra note 20, at 148. Professor Buzbee notes that
pure ceiling preemption would involve a federal law that merely permits state regulation up to a certain
point, allowing states to choose how much to regulate as long as they regulate below a threshold of
maximum regulation. This would allow some regulatory choices for states, unlike in a unitary federal
choice form of ceiling preemption. This “true ceiling” would be the converse of a regulatory floor, but,
per Buzbee, no such true ceilings exist in U.S. law. See id. at 147.
80 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b); see also Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1562.
72
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that impose supplemental warning label requirements on pharmaceuticals
that go beyond the Food and Drug Administration’s requirements. 81 In the
last several decades, the prevalence of ceiling preemption has grown
significantly in environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act.82
C. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association:
Anticommandeering and Preemption Doctrines Intersect?
In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Court struck
down another method 83 of circumventing the commandeering prohibition.
Murphy clarified that the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering rule
applies not only when Congress compels states to affirmatively enact federal
programs but also when Congress mandates that states forbear from enacting
state regulation. 84 In other words, the Court stated that the Tenth Amendment
limits Congress’s ability to command what states may not do, in addition to
constraining Congress’s direction of what states must do.
At issue in Murphy was the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act (PASPA), a law enacted in 1992 which made it “unlawful for a
governmental entity” 85 to “authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme” based on
“competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate”
(the anti-authorization provision). 86 A second provision made it unlawful for
“a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” such sports gambling
schemes “pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity.” 87
PASPA did not make sports gambling a federal crime, but it did permit civil
actions to enjoin individuals or government entities that violated either
provision. 88
In 2011, New Jersey constituents approved a state constitutional
amendment that permitted the legislature to authorize sports gambling at
casinos and racetracks, revising an 1897 constitutional amendment that
81

See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 476 (2013).
See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1568; Brian T. Burgess, Note, Limiting
Preemption in Environmental Law: An Analysis of the Cost-Externalization Argument and California
Assembly Bill 1493, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 266 (2009).
83 Two decades earlier, the Court clarified that Congress cannot circumvent New York’s prohibition
on commandeering state legislatures by directly commandeering state executive officers instead. See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); see also supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
84 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
85 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2000), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485. PASPA defines a
“governmental entity” to include a State or any of its political subdivisions. 28 U.S.C. § 3701(2).
86 Id. § 3702(1). This provision shall be referred to as the anti-authorization provision, which is the
term used by the Court.
87 Id. § 3702(2).
88 Id. § 3703.
82
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prohibited all forms of gambling. 89 The state legislature responded with the
Sports Wagering Law of 2012, which permitted state-licensed sports
gambling at casinos and racetracks. 90 The National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) and various professional sports leagues then sued to
enjoin New Jersey’s new law on the grounds that it violated PASPA. 91 In
response, New Jersey argued that PASPA itself violated the
anticommandeering principle by prohibiting the state from enacting any law
legalizing sports gambling. 92
The district court agreed with the NCAA’s contention that the Tenth
Amendment was only implicated when the federal government issued an
affirmative command to act, rather than a prohibition on action, and found
that PASPA’s anti-authorization provision was more akin to a “larger
Congressional scheme controlling the area of sports wagering” that
preempted state action. 93 The Third Circuit affirmed on similar grounds, but
did not interpret PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from merely repealing its
ban on sports wagering, 94 and the Supreme Court denied review. 95
The New Jersey legislature tried once more, this time taking the Third
Circuit’s hint and only repealing provisions of state law that prohibited
betting on sporting events at casinos and racetracks, rather than formally
authorizing sports betting, as the prior law had attempted. 96 The same
plaintiffs challenged the new law, and the district court and Third Circuit
again held that New Jersey’s law violated PASPA and denied New Jersey’s
argument that PASPA impermissibly commandeered state legislatures.97
Critical to the court’s assessment of the commandeering argument was the
distinction between federally commanded action and inaction, and a finding
that PASPA required only state inaction. 98 The Third Circuit, sitting en banc,
observed that “PASPA does not command states to take affirmative actions,”

89

N.J. CONST. art. IV, §§ VII(2)(D), (F); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1469.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A–2 (West 2012) (repealed 2014).
91 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d sub
nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
92 Id. at 561.
93 Id. at 562, 570–71.
94 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated
by Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
95 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (denying certiorari).
96 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A–7 (West 2014) (repealed 2018).
97 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016), rev’d sub
nom. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
98 Id. (distinguishing PASPA from the facts in New York because PASPA “does not require states to
take any action”).
90

1030

114:1015 (2020) Commandeering, Preemption, and Vehicle Emissions Regulation

and thus, the court’s prior reasoning “that PASPA does not commandeer the
states remains unshaken.” 99
The Supreme Court granted review and reversed the Third Circuit,
holding that PASPA’s anti-authorization provision did indeed violate the
anticommandeering doctrine and could not be saved from unconstitutionality
as a valid preemption provision. 100 Writing for the 7-2 majority, Justice Alito
described the anticommandeering doctrine as a simple recognition that
Congress’s enumerated powers do not include the ability to issue direct
orders to state governments. 101
Beginning with New York and Printz as foundations, the Court ruled
that there is no difference between Congress compelling a state to enact
legislation and prohibiting a state from enacting new laws—such a
“distinction is empty,” and “[t]he basic principle—that Congress cannot
issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.” 102 PASPA’s
anti-authorization provision “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature
may and may not do[,] . . . as if federal officers were installed in state
legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators
from voting on any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state
sovereignty is not easy to imagine.” 103
The Court next considered the argument that PASPA’s antiauthorization provision constituted a valid preemption scheme and so was
not invalidated by the anticommandeering principle. 104 Here, the Court
articulated that preemption is valid only where “Congress enacts a law that
imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors; a state law confers
rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law; and therefore
the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.” 105 PASPA’s
anti-authorization provision, the Court concluded, neither conferred federal
rights on private actors to engage in sports gambling, nor imposed federal
restrictions on private actors—it only made it unlawful for states to authorize
sports gambling regimes. 106 Thus, the preemption analysis as set by Murphy
hinges on the subject of the federal regulation: private actors or the state

99

Id. at 401.
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478, 1479, 1485 (2018).
101 Id. at 1476. Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion except for Part VI-B, on severability,
because he disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that PASPA was inseverable. Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102 Id. at 1478.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1479.
105 Id. at 1480.
106 Id. at 1481.
100
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itself. While PASPA’s second provision did regulate individuals directly,107
the Court found PASPA to be inseverable and invalidated the Act. 108
In sum, Murphy expanded the Court’s anticommandeering
jurisprudence to areas in which Congress instructs states to forbear from
legislating—leaving scholars questioning how this impacts preemption.
D. Murphy’s Impact on the Commandeering and Preemption Doctrines
There is some doctrinal line between prohibitions of state regulation via
preemption, which are permitted, and commandeering mandates, which are
not, but this line is not always clear. As Professor Bulman-Pozen noted,
“[t]he prohibition on commandeering follows from structural and normative
considerations that also attend federal preemption of state law.” 109 She
continues that “distinct framings may make a given federal law appear
merely to be prohibiting a conflicting state action (preemption) or instead to
be coercing a state to undertake a certain activity (commandeering).” 110
Prior to Murphy, the Court’s opinions in New York and Printz suggested
that the difference turns on whether Congress affirmatively compels state
action (impermissible) versus merely requires that states refrain from
enacting particular laws and regulations (permissible).111 Indeed, many
scholars agreed with this distinction, and there has been little written to
challenge the validity of such a bright line or argue normatively that the line
is misplaced. 112 In short, the dividing line separating commandeering and
preemption was a distinction between compelled action and compelled
inaction.
The Court in Murphy obliterated this line by stating that such a
“distinction is empty” and rejected the contention that “commandeering
107

28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2000); see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482–84.
109 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Essay, Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 2029, 2042 (2018).
110 Id.
111 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
188 (1992).
112 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 94–95 (“A requirement that state legislators enact a particular
statute seems, somehow, to be more of an interference with state autonomy than a requirement that they
refrain from enacting a particular statute. . . . In short, we believe that there is a good conceptual,
interpretive, and normative case for construing the preemption/commandeering distinction as a distinction
between inaction and action.”); Jackson, supra note 47, at 2201–02 (discussing the difference between
preemption and commandeering as a difference of compelled inaction versus compelled action); R. Seth
Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering, and the Values of Cooperative Federalism: An
Analysis of Section 216 of EPAct, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 418 (2008) (describing courts’
commandeering analyses assuming that suspect laws include commands that require action by the state).
108
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occurs ‘only when Congress goes beyond precluding state action and
affirmatively commands it.’” 113 Going forward, it matters not whether
Congress commands affirmative state action or prohibits a state from
legislating—in both cases, the anticommandeering rule applies. 114 Murphy’s
first doctrinal impact, thus, is its new definition of the anticommandeering
doctrine as the “basic principle[] that Congress cannot issue direct orders to
state legislatures,” which includes “laws that direct[] the States either to
enact or to refrain from enacting a regulation of the conduct of activities
occurring within their borders.” 115
Scholars were scattered on what Murphy means for the dividing line
between preemption and commandeering, and what impact that has on
various federal laws. The Court’s decision puzzled many who saw a direct
conflict between its clarified rule against commandeering (that Congress
cannot issue direct orders to state governments) 116 and the traditional
understanding of preemption. 117 As Dean Vikram Amar remarked, “every
congressional enactment that properly accomplishes federal preemption
either explicitly or implicitly ‘direct[s] the States [] to . . . refrain from . . .
regulation’ of some kind.” 118 But Dean Amar went on to predict a tempered
impact, suggesting that Murphy was neither a blundered one-off ruling nor
an erosion of the long-standing doctrine of preemption. 119 Rather, Dean
Amar concluded that Murphy’s primary impact is on conditional preemption,
requiring that the conditions placed upon states to avoid preemption be laid
out explicitly and clearly. 120
Others were more troubled about Murphy’s impact. Several scholars
contended that the same concerns of commandeering are likewise implicated
in preemption, and warned that Murphy’s definition of “valid preemption

113

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 19).
See id.
115 Id. at 1478–79.
116 Id. at 1476.
117 See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, “Clarifying” Murphy’s Law: Did Something Go Wrong in
Reconciling Commandeering and Conditional Preemption Doctrines?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 299; Daniel
Hemel, Justice Alito, State Tax Hero?, MEDIUM (May 15, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-sourcederived/justice-alito-state-tax-hero-333830d097ab [https://perma.cc/8EJL-FF48]; Jeff Schmitt, Murphy
v. NCAA: Anti-Commandeering, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, FAC.
LOUNGE (May 15, 2018, 09:32 AM), https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2018/05/murphy-v-ncaa-anticommandeering-prigg-v-pennsylvania-and-the-dormant-commerce-clause.html [https://perma.cc/J94NBWVZ].
118 Amar, supra note 117, at 300 (quoting Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479).
119 See id. at 301.
120 See id. For background on conditional preemption, see supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
114
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provisions” 121 might be too narrow and lead to invalidation of numerous
preemption provisions. 122 In the tax context, Professors Brian Galle and
Daniel Hemel argued that Murphy threatens the constitutionality of upwards
of 100 federal provisions that limit the states’ power to tax. 123 Professor
Matthew Melone also argued that Murphy’s outcome prohibits Congress’s
ability to streamline state sales tax and use tax regimes for remote and digital
sellers. 124 In the immigration context, Professor Ilya Somin concurred with
the Court’s conclusion that there is no difference between commandeering
and prohibiting affirmative state laws, and argued that Murphy bolsters his
argument that federal immigration legislation targeting sanctuary cities
violates the anticommandeering rule.125 Professor Josh Blackman agreed,
arguing that a provision of the Immigration Code which forbids states from
enacting sanctuary laws that restrict any state official from sharing
information with federal immigration authorities is facially unconstitutional
after Murphy. 126 Finally, Professor Sam Kamin added that Murphy likely
limits federal power to restrict state marijuana legalization.127
121 Under Murphy, for a legal provision to qualify as a valid form of preemption, it must be “best
read as one that regulates private actors,” meaning that it “imposes restrictions or confers rights on private
actors.” Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479–80.
122 See, e.g., Matthew A. Melone, Murphy v. NCAA & South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.: The Court’s
Anticommandeering Jurisprudence May Preclude Congressional Action with Respect to Sales Taxes on
Internet Sales, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 413, 445 (2019) (“[T]he Court’s rather opaque reasoning with respect
to the preemption versus anticommandeering issue casts doubt on the federal government’s ability to
prohibit state action in a number of circumstances.”); Daniel Hemel, More on Murphy—And a Response
to Critics, MEDIUM (May 16, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/more-on-murphyand-a-response-to-critics-471b35c75ecb [http://perma.cc/UP4N-H3MN]; see also Mark Brnovich,
Betting on Federalism: Murphy v. NCAA and the Future of Sports Gambling, 2017–2018 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 247, 259–63 (2018) (discussing Murphy’s impacts on state taxation and immigration).
123 See
Brian Galle, Murphy’s (Misguided) Law, MEDIUM (May 15, 2018),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/murphys-misguided-law-8c22889918e4
[http://perma.cc/4PJS-9TZ5] (noting that Murphy jeopardizes the constitutionality of approximately 110
federal provisions that limit state authority to tax); Hemel, supra note 117 (focusing on Murphy’s
implications for immigration law and tax law); Hemel, supra note 122.
124 See Melone, supra note 122.
125 See Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration’s Attack on
Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEX. L. REV.
1247, 1274, 1277, 1279 (2019); see also Ilya Somin, Broader Implications of the Supreme Court’s Sports
Gambling Decision, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 16, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/
2018/05/16/broader-implications-of-the-supreme-cour [http://perma.cc/SYX5-QTXZ] [hereinafter
Somin, Broader Implications] (suggesting that Murphy is “good news for sanctuary cities”).
126 See Josh Blackman, Improper Commandeering, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 959, 982 (2019)
(discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012), which proscribes any federal, state, or local governmental entity
from prohibiting another government entity from exchanging information with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service regarding the immigration status of any individual).
127 Sam Kamin, Opinion, Murphy v. NCAA: It’s About Much More than Gambling on Sports, HILL
(May 15, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/387653-murphy-v-ncaa-its-about-muchmore-than-gambling-on-sports [http://perma.cc/DFF2-H9K3].
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But the most straightforward reading of Murphy, as advocated by
Professors Rick Hills and Ilya Somin, 128 shows that the Court’s opinion does
not threaten all preemptive federal laws under the banner of anticommandeering, at least as it pertains to environmental legislation. Longstanding theory of preemption, pioneering cases on commandeering, and
even the approach in Murphy itself all demonstrate that Congress’s broad
preemption power remains untouched by Murphy’s reformulation of the
anticommandeering rule, as long as Congress correctly preempts.
Preemption has consistently been recognized as an alternative way for
Congress to regulate intrastate activities while avoiding the
anticommandeering problem. 129 As Professor Andrew Ayers described,
“Congress does not impermissibly commandeer the states when it uses its
preemption power, even when it regulates individuals directly in an area
where states have traditionally been the primary regulators.”130 The
foundational anticommandeering cases explicitly stated that preemption was
not limited by the Tenth Amendment, 131 and offered preemption, conditional
preemption, and conditional spending as alternatives to unconstitutional
commandeering. 132 Moreover, the analysis in Murphy is consistent with these
earlier cases: the Court first asked whether PASPA’s anti-authorization
provision violated the anticommandeering principle and then considered
whether it could be saved from unconstitutionality as a valid preemption
provision. 133 Thus, as long as a law meets the requirements to constitute a

128

See Rick Hills, Murphy v. NCAA’s Escape from Baseline Hell, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 16, 2018,
7:11 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/murphy-v-ncaas-escape-from-baselinehell.html [http://perma.cc/U9NN-JD32] (arguing that Murphy’s new framework for commandeering does
not threaten traditional preemption); Somin, Broader Implications, supra note 125 (doubting that Murphy
undermines federal preemption power).
129 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 25, at 1673 (“[T]he Rehnquist Court left preemption wide open as an
alternative to commandeering.”).
130 Andrew B. Ayers, Federalism and the Right to Decide Who Decides, 63 VILL. L. REV. 567, 590
(2018).
131 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997) (stating that issues of commandeering are
avoided if the Brady Act’s questionable provisions “are taken to refer to nothing more (or less) than the
duty owed to the National Government, on the part of all state officials, to enact, enforce, and interpret
state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law”); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the
States to regulate. The Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and
to pre-empt contrary state regulation.”); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 290–91 (1981) (“A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or pre-empt
state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with federal
law[,]” and “nothing in National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment shields the States
from pre-emptive federal regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce.”).
132 See New York, 505 U.S. at 166–67.
133 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478–79 (2018).
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valid exercise of preemption, as discussed below, anticommandeering
concerns fall by the wayside.
Murphy’s second doctrinal impact is its test for determining whether a
regulatory scheme is a valid form of preemption altogether. According to
Murphy, a valid preemption provision (a) “represent[s] the exercise of a
power conferred on Congress by the Constitution,” and (b) is “best read as
[a law] that regulates private actors.” 134 More specifically, the Court
instructed that all valid preemption schemes involve a federal law that
“imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors” and a state law that
“confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law,”
leading the federal law to take precedence and preempt the state law. 135 In
sum, under this refined test for preemption, federal laws that primarily direct
regulation at states by prohibiting them from acting (such as PASPA) are no
longer valid forms of preemption, and instead, constitute commandeering.
While pivoting away from the action versus inaction division that
previously distinguished commandeering from preemption, 136 the Murphy
Court supplanted that line with a reframed one that focuses on the identity of
the regulated party: whether the law is best read to regulate private actors, or
to act upon the state directly. 137 Applying that test, the Court found that
PASPA’s anti-authorization provision did not grant individuals a federal
right to engage in sports gambling, nor did it prohibit private actors from
doing so. 138 Instead, PASPA issued a direct command prohibiting state
authorization. 139 Thus, the anti-authorization provision was not a valid form
of preemption, and anticommandeering principles doomed the law. 140
In sum, the Court in Murphy may have expanded the
anticommandeering doctrine and eliminated the easy test between
commandeering and preemption that prohibited affirmative directives to
states (as unlawful commandeering) but permitted mere instructions to
forbear (as valid preemption). But in its place, Murphy substituted another
formalist distinction that turns on the target of regulation—whether Congress
is regulating the state directly or regulating private actors, and if the latter,
134

Id. at 1479.
Id. at 1480.
136 See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text; supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
137 Id. at 1479.
138 Id. at 1481. Strangely, the Court declined to consider the fact that PASPA’s second provision
directly prohibited private actors from engaging in sports gambling. Melone, supra note 122, at 446
(“Although the Court noted the existence of this provision, it did not discuss the provision in the context
of preemption, but instead, it discussed this provision only in the context of its severability from the
operative provision at issue.”); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
139 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2000), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461.
140 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481.
135
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whether Congress is only indirectly precluding the states from acting.
Murphy also left preemption as a clear alternative means of achieving the
same end as commandeering: eliminating state regulatory discretion.
Using the Clean Air Act to test Murphy’s application, the remainder of
this Note demonstrates that Murphy’s formalist approach is flawed in two
respects: (a) it problematically fails to account for certain cooperative
federalism schemes where Congress is in dialogue with state legislatures
with the joint goal of regulating third parties, and (b) it fails to apply a
consistent standard of protecting federalism values to preemption and
commandeering.
II. VEHICLE EMISSIONS REGULATION UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Environmental regulation is fraught with tension between federal and
state control, which is at an apex with the Clean Air Act.141 States have long
played a critical role in environmental regulation, since responsibility for
environmental protection originally fell exclusively to state governments.142
California broke ground in 1960, enacting the first vehicle emissions control
program in the nation to address serious smog problems in Los Angeles. 143
Five years later, Congress followed California’s lead by passing a precursor
to the Clean Air Act that imposed federal automobile emissions standards
which were then rolled into the Clean Air Act of 1970. 144
Noting that environmental policy efforts at the state level preceded
federal programs in many respects, it is no surprise that drafters of the Clean
Air Act envisioned a continued role for states like California in controlling
air pollution, and the Act is now heralded as a model of cooperative
federalism. 145 This Part details the Act’s unique preemptive structure for
vehicle emissions regulation, chronicles the leading role that states have
played to spur greater pollution control, and describes the effects of the
EPA’s SAFE Rule.
141 Adler, supra note 75, at 447 (“Among all federal environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act [] is
the source of the greatest state-federal conflict.”).
142 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models,
54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1995).
143 PERCIVAL, supra note 5, at 527; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:
A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 585 (2001). California promulgated the first vehicle
emissions standards in 1961. See Adelman, supra note 2, at 252–53.
144 Revesz, supra note 143, at 585–86.
145 See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1550 n.7; Holly Doremus & W. Michael
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is
Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 800 (2008); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr.,
Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in
Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV.
15, 16 (2004).
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A. The Clean Air Act’s Preemptive Structure
Most of the Clean Air Act imposes floor preemption, setting federal
standards for air pollutants but permitting more stringent state regulations.146
But in the case of air pollutants resulting from vehicles, the Act requires
national uniformity, expressly stating that “[n]o state . . . shall adopt or
attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles.” 147 However, Congress qualified this preemption provision
with a mechanism for California alone to seek a waiver of preemption.148
Using this waiver provision, California successfully obtained more than fifty
waivers since 1967. 149
Importantly, the Act does not grant the EPA, the agency tasked with
carrying out the Clean Air Act, complete discretion in denying or granting
California a waiver. Instead, the Act states that the EPA Administrator
“shall” grant a waiver if California “determines that the State standards will
be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as
applicable Federal standards.” 150 It also permits the Administrator to deny a
waiver application if she finds the presence of one of three conditions: (a)
California’s determination that its standards are at least as protective as the
federal standards is arbitrary and capricious; (b) California’s standards are
not needed to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions; 151 or (c) the

146

See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012) (stating that, except in the case of vehicle emissions, nothing in the
Clean Air Act precludes any state from adopting or enforcing emissions standards that are at least as
stringent as the federal requirements); see also Revesz, supra note 143, at 586.
147 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). This particular provision was motivated by Congress’s fear that automobile
manufacturers might face up to fifty different standards if states could independently regulate emissions.
See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1195
(1995).
148 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b); Carlson, supra note 4, at 292–93 (describing how California is the only state
that is eligible to receive a waiver); see also supra note 4.
149 Memorandum from John B. Stephenson, Dir., Nat. Res. & Env’t, U.S. GAO, to Congressional
Requesters (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09249r.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM6H4TR4].
150 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
151 The EPA’s well-established practice is to review California’s vehicle emissions program
holistically when analyzing whether it is needed to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions.” See
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 14. The EPA has interpreted the query to refer to whether there are
general circumstances unique to California that are primarily responsible for causing its air pollution
problem. Id. at 15; see also Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver, 73 Fed. Reg. 12156, 12159–60 (Mar.
6, 2008). Each time it has applied for a waiver, California has successfully demonstrated that its unique
geography and weather pattern exacerbate the effects of climate change and that vehicle emissions limits
are linked to a reduction in smog and the impacts of climate change, and these underlying circumstances
remain the case today. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 15–16, n.77.
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state standards are inconsistent with the requirements for federal emissions
standards under the Clean Air Act. 152
The history of the Clean Air Act’s enactment also indicates that
Congress intended the presumption that California is entitled to a waiver,
with the goal of preserving California’s regulatory authority. 153 As to the
presumption, the House of Representatives considered an amendment to the
Act in 1967 that would shift the burden to California to show that it required
more stringent standards but rejected the change, leaving the presumption in
place. 154 Regarding the driving purpose behind the waiver, legislative history
also provides evidence that Congress included the waiver provision not
because California had a particularly bad smog problem, but to enable
California’s continued experimentation in vehicle emissions regulation for
the benefit of the nation. 155 The D.C. Circuit has used this history to uphold
the EPA Administrator’s grant of a waiver against challenges from the
automobile industry, reasoning that
The history of congressional consideration of the California waiver
provision . . . indicates that Congress intended the State to continue and expand
its pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing motor vehicle emission
standards different from and in large measure more advanced than the
corresponding federal program; in short, to act as a kind of laboratory for
innovation. 156

152 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). The third condition, (c), requires that the rules governing the EPA’s
determination of national standards also apply to California’s setting of standards. For example, both the
national and California standards must provide four years of lead time before enforcing a revised standard
for heavy-duty vehicles. See id. § 7521(a)(3)(C).
153 Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1110–11 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Rachel L. Chanin,
Note, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 699, 716–19 (2003). For deeper background on the rich history of the Clean Air Act and
California’s pioneering role in the area of vehicle emissions regulation, see, for example, JAMES E. KRIER
& EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE
WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940–1975, at 177–95 (1977); Chanin, supra, at 713–21.
154 Chanin, supra note 153, at 714–16; see H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 22 (1967), as reprinted in
1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1958.
155 See Waiver of Federal Preemption Notice of Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 18887, 18890 (May 3, 1984)
(granting California a preemption waiver and stating that “[i]f Congress had been concerned only with
California’s smog problem, however, it easily could have limited the ability of California to set more
stringent standards . . . . Instead, Congress took a broader approach consistent with its goal of allowing
California to operate its own comprehensive program.”); Chanin, supra note 153, at 717–19 (quoting
several legislators’ statements on the rationale for Congress’s inclusion of the California waiver).
156 Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 1110–11. The court quoted the House Committee Report
for the 1977 Amendment to the Act, which permitted other states to adopt California’s standards, as
stating that “[t]he Committee amendment is intended to ratify and strengthen the California waiver
provision and to affirm the underlying intent of that provision, i.e., to afford California the broadest
possible discretion in selecting the best means to protect the health of its citizens and the public welfare.”
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Further solidifying California’s position as a leader in environmental
regulation, Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1977 to permit any other
state to adopt California’s emissions standards in lieu of the federal
standards. 157 Other states were still preempted from establishing independent
regulatory systems but could enforce standards that were “identical” to
California’s preemption-waived standards. 158 As Professor Jody Freeman
remarked, the Act “thus essentially authorize[d] a ‘two-car’ country [in
which] the auto industry must meet EPA emissions standards nationally, and
may also need to meet even more stringent standards in California (and the
so-called ‘section 177 states’ that adopt California’s standards).” 159 Thirteen
states and the District of Columbia currently follow California’s standards,
in total representing over 35% of new vehicles sold in the United States. 160
B. The Role of States in Greenhouse Gas Regulation
As bureaucracy and partisanship stymie federal lawmaking and as
Presidential administration turnovers make agency rules impermanent,161
states can be a source of administrative regularity and adapt policies more

Id. at 1110 (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 301–02 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1380–81).
157 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2012); see also May, supra note 22, at 474.
158 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
159 Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal,”
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 350 n.42 (2011). “Section 177 states” refers to the states that choose,
under Section 177 of the Clean Air Act, to adopt California’s standards in lieu of the federal standards.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
160 A Brief History of US Fuel Efficiency Standards, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/fuel-efficiency/fuel-economy-basics.html
[https://perma.cc/HT2T-52UY]. These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington. States that Have Adopted California’s Vehicle Standards Under
Section 177 of the Federal Clean Air Act, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Sept. 27, 2019), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/
resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal
[https://perma.cc/R7SQ-W3AY]; U.S.: Section 177 States, TRANSPORTPOLICY.NET, https://www.
transportpolicy.net/standard/us-section-177-states/ [https://perma.cc/8GCH-2YCZ]. Additionally, in
September 2019, the governors of Minnesota and New Mexico both announced plans to adopt the
California standards under Section 177. David Shepardson, Minnesota, New Mexico to Adopt California
Vehicle Emissions Rules, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autosemissions-california-minnesota/minnesota-new-mexico-to-adopt-california-vehicle-emissions-rulesidUSKBN1WA2SJ [https://perma.cc/WTU8-TLLQ].
161 See, e.g., Nadja Popovich et al., 85 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environmentrollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/8LFL-Q3VF]; Connor Raso, Where and Why Has Agency Rulemaking
Declined Under Trump?, BROOKINGS (June 29, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/where-andwhy-has-agency-rulemaking-declined-under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/5M4J-SDHP].
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quickly, driving innovation. 162 Policies addressing climate change are a
prime example, as states have played a leading role in securing federal
regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the Clean Air Act. 163 The Act
delegates authority to the EPA to identify which air pollutants are anticipated
to “endanger public health or welfare” and thus must be subject to emissions
standards. 164 For decades, the EPA passed regulations setting standards for
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, and other hazardous air
pollutants, achieving more than 90% reductions in those tailpipe
emissions. 165 Notably, GHGs were not deemed to have an adverse impact on
public health or welfare and, thus, were not subject to the Clean Air Act until
significant efforts by states along two fronts.
First, several states petitioned the EPA in the 1990s to regulate GHGs
on the grounds that GHG emissions “endanger public health or welfare.”166
The EPA rejected the suggestion, but Massachusetts challenged this denial
in court in 2005. 167 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that
GHGs do constitute “air pollutants” and must be regulated under the Clean
Air Act if they endanger public health or welfare.168 In December 2009, the
EPA complied with the Court’s instruction and found that GHG emissions
pollute the air and “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare,” thus requiring the EPA to set GHG emissions standards. 169
Second, states took it upon themselves to regulate GHG emissions. In
2002, California passed the first legislation requiring automobile
manufacturers to reduce GHG emissions, which would apply to model year
2009 vehicles. 170 Other states followed suit, adopting California’s GHG

162 See David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of
Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347,
355–57 (1994); Revesz, supra note 143, at 631.
163 May, supra note 22, at 470–72. For background on greenhouse gases, see supra note 30.
164 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012).
165 History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States, U.S. EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/accomplishments-and-successair-pollution-transportation [https://perma.cc/MFV7-ZHYU].
166 See May, supra note 22, at 472.
167 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922–23 (Sept.
8, 2003); Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
168 549 U.S. 497, 528, 532 (2007).
169 Freeman, supra note 159, at 351; see also Endangerment Findings, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66496
(Dec. 15, 2009) (“[G]reenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public health and the public
welfare of current and future generations.”).
170 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2002); see also Keeth, supra note 22, at 719
(explaining that the California law is “the first law of its kind in the nation requiring automakers to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases”).
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emissions limits pending the EPA’s approval of California’s waiver.171
California petitioned the EPA in 2005 for a preemption waiver to implement
its new GHG emissions standards, but despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency denied California’s waiver request in
December 2007—the first denial in thirty-seven years. 172 EPA Administrator
Stephen Johnson explained that “greenhouse gases are fundamentally global
in nature,” and therefore, California failed to show a “need to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions” as required by the Clean Air
Act. 173 But soon thereafter in 2008, after political pressure and a change in
executive administration, the EPA reconsidered the denial and granted the
waiver for California’s GHG standards, 174 determining that “it makes no
difference whether California seeks a waiver to implement separate
standards in response to its own specific, local air pollution problems, or
whether California seeks a waiver to implement separate standards designed
to address a global air pollution problem.” 175
C. The SAFE Rule: Withdrawing California’s
Preemption Waiver
In 2009, the Obama Administration proposed a bold increase in federal
standards for vehicle emissions and fuel economy, and secured agreement
from American automakers on the condition that the national standards were
harmonized with California’s regulations to avoid the two-car country. 176
California agreed to revise its emissions requirements for vehicles sold in the
state such that cars that met the new federal standards would be deemed to

171 May, supra note 22, at 475; see also PEW CTR. ON GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, LEARNING FROM
STATE ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2005), https://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/
reports/2006report/2005-12-08_PEW_CENTER_REPORT.PDF [https://perma.cc/J37H-SZT7] (listing
ten states that planned to follow California’s vehicle standards for GHG emissions).
172 See JAMES E. MCCARTHY & ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RES. SERV., CALIFORNIA’S WAIVER
REQUEST UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES FROM MOTOR
VEHICLES 5, 10–11 (2009), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc87329/m1/1/high_res_d/
RL34099_2009Feb10.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPX4-YG22]; May, supra note 22, at 475–76; Stephenson,
supra note 149, at 2.
173 Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Adm’r, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal.
(Dec. 19, 2007), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/documents/20071219-slj.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H46D-4Y48].
174 Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744 (July 8, 2009); Freeman, supra note
159, at 352; Laura Hall, Note, The Evolution of CAFE Standards: Fuel Economy Regulation Enters Its
Second Act, 39 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2011).
175 SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986, 43241 (Aug. 24, 2018).
176 Hall, supra note 174, at 20–23. The “two-car country” describes how manufacturers may need to
develop two separate vehicle fleets, one to meet the national standard and another to meet the higher
California standard. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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be in compliance with California’s standards 177—but maintained its more
stringent standards on the books. 178 Thus, if the federal standards became
more lenient, California could revoke the reciprocity with federal standards
and once again require manufacturers to meet the state standards.179
The EPA granted California’s latest request for a waiver of preemption
for its Advanced Clean Cars program, Zero Emissions Vehicle mandate, and
more stringent GHG standards in January 2013, a waiver that extended
through model year 2025 vehicles. 180 Meanwhile, the EPA continued to
increase the standards annually, and in the waning days of President
Obama’s tenure, the EPA published a Final Determination in January 2017
that locked emissions standards through 2025. 181
However, just two months later and after a change in administration,
new EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt announced an intention to reconsider
the 2017 Final Determination and assess whether the standards through 2025
were appropriate. 182 Then, in April 2018, the EPA formally withdrew the
2017 Final Determination and reopened the rulemaking process to set new
standards for 2022 to 2025 in light of “recent data” that the Obama
Administration purportedly failed to consider. 183
On August 24, 2018, the EPA proposed a new plan, the Safer
Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Rule, which would freeze standards at
2020 levels through 2026. 184 The SAFE Rule also proposed to withdraw the
preemption waivers previously granted to California through 2025,
eliminating California’s ability to set emissions standards that deviate
whatsoever from the now-frozen federal standards. 185 The EPA cited two
primary justifications under the Clean Air Act’s waiver denial provisions for

177

2010 Final Rule: Light-Duty Vehicle Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25328 (May 7, 2010).
See Letter from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman, CARB, to Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, EPA, & Ray
LaHood, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (May 18, 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201610/documents/air-resources-board.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJK5-WTEN].
179 Id.
180 Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver, 78 Fed. Reg. 2112 (Jan. 9, 2013).
181 See U.S. EPA, FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE MODEL YEAR
2022–2025 LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS STANDARDS UNDER THE
(2017), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100QQ91.pdf
MIDTERM EVALUATION
[https://perma.cc/59SV-B2UU].
182 Notice of Intention to Reconsider Midterm Determination, 82 Fed. Reg. 14671 (Mar. 22, 2017).
183 Press Release, U.S. EPA, GHG Emissions Standards for Cars and Light Trucks Should Be
Revised (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-administrator-pruitt-ghg-emissionsstandards-cars-and-light-trucks-should-be [https://perma.cc/2PHU-8DQ6].
184 SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986, 42988 (Aug. 24, 2018).
185 Id. at 43232; see also U.S. EPA, PROPOSED CALIFORNIA WAIVER WITHDRAWAL (2018),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100V26M.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X4H-2QH6].
178
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withdrawing California’s waiver. 186 First, the EPA asserted that California
does not need its more stringent standards to meet “compelling and
extraordinary conditions” because the standards (a) address environmental
problems not unique to California, (b) are not necessitated by emissions
unique to California, and (c) will not provide a remedy unique to
California. 187 Second, the EPA claimed that California’s emissions standards
are technologically infeasible for car manufacturers to meet without
additional time to develop new technology and, therefore, are inconsistent
with the Clean Air Act’s national emissions requirements. 188 Additionally,
the EPA claimed that California’s entire ability to set these vehicle emissions
standards is preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,
which grants the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration the power
to set fuel economy guidelines. 189 Therefore, the EPA concluded, any
waivers granted to California are moot.
In September 2019, the EPA published the first part of the final SAFE
Rule, the One National Program, which finalizes the revocation of
California’s waiver and makes clear that the state is preempted from setting
vehicle GHG emissions limits or mandating zero-emissions vehicles. 190 This
is the first instance in history where the EPA has attempted to revoke a
preemption waiver; the proper procedure for doing so, and indeed the very

186 Whether or not the statutory justifications for denying a waiver apply to a revocation of an
already-granted waiver is a central issue in the current legal arguments against the SAFE Rule. See, e.g.,
DENISE A. GRAB ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, NO TURNING BACK 1–16 (2018).
187 U.S. EPA, supra note 185. Under President Bush, the EPA used similar reasoning to initially deny
a preemption waiver that would allow California to regulate vehicle GHG emissions, which the EPA later
granted under President Obama. See supra notes 176–181 and accompanying text.
188 Id. Recall that the Clean Air Act’s waiver provision states that no waiver shall be issued if
California’s standards are “not consistent” with the Act’s requirements for the national standard. See
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(C) (2012). Here, the EPA invoked Section 202(a)(2), which provides that any
emissions regulation “shall take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit
the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost
of compliance within such period.” Id. § 7521(a)(2). Accordingly, the EPA argued that California’s
standards take effect too early. For a helpful economic argument about why this lead time concern is
unfounded, see generally NOLL ET AL., supra note 11.
189 Keith Goldberg, Auto Emissions Plan Hearing Sparks Regulator War of Words, LAW360 (June
20, 2019, 7:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1171231/auto-emissions-plan-hearing-sparksregulator-war-of-words [https://perma.cc/YE4R-VEE9]. For further information on this argument, see
CAFE Standards and the California Preemption Plan, HARV. L. SCH. ENVTL. & ENERGY L. PROGRAM
(Aug. 24, 2018), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/cafe-standards-and-the-california-preemptionplan/ [https://perma.cc/P3ZY-NA8R]. For responses to this specific argument, see CARLSON ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 17–19, and GRAB ET AL., supra note 186, at 17–18.
190 SAFE Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310, 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). The Administration anticipates issuing the complementary final rule
rolling back national emissions standards in the near future. Id.
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legality of a revocation, is currently the topic of debate. 191 No matter the
result of that procedural dispute, the revocation has reinvigorated discussion
about the role of states in environmental protection.
III. FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY OVER VEHICLE EMISSIONS
REGULATION AFTER MURPHY
Murphy fractured the preexisting line separating impermissible
commandeering from permissible preemption, which caused concern over
what impact the broadened commandeering prohibition has on the
availability of preemption as an alternative. 192 In fact, this issue arose in oral
arguments in Murphy itself. 193 But as legal precedent, Murphy has little
impact on Congress’s broad power over state regulation. Rather than
providing clarity or guiding principles for the bounds of federal control of
state policy, the Court swapped one formalist distinction in favor of another:
from an action versus inaction division to a test hinging on whether the party
most directly regulated is the state or private actors. 194
The result of this formalism is a nod toward tightening commandeering
restrictions, but the unbounded availability of preemption as an alternative
approach to the same ends means that the anticommandeering doctrine is
mostly toothless to protect the states’ abilities to control private activities.
Congress can merely replace a commandeering scheme with a preemptive
one, and the impact is the same: in both cases, it disarms the states from
acting, yet one method is constitutional while the other is not. With PASPA
deemed unconstitutional commandeering, for example, states may now
legalize sports gambling, 195 but Congress could enact federal legislation
prohibiting individuals from engaging in sports gambling and preempt all
related state regulation, achieving the same outcome as PASPA sought.
California is in the midst of a battle with the EPA to retain its fifty-yearlong ability to set more stringent vehicle emissions standards than the

191

See, e.g., GRAB ET AL., supra note 186, at i.
See supra Section I.D; see, e.g., Melone, supra note 122, at 442 (“The Court’s clarification that
the federal government can no more order a state to do nothing than it can order a state to do something
begs the question of how the anticommandeering principle coexists with preemption.”).
193 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct.
1461 (2018) (Nos. 16-476, 16-477) (where Justice Kagan asked Paul Clement, representing the NCAA,
“what’s the line you would draw as between preemption and commandeering?”); id. at 9 (where Justice
Kagan asked Ted Olson, representing the state of New Jersey, “[w]hen do we know that [the federal
government has] enacted a sufficiently comprehensive regulatory scheme in order to allow preemption
of state rules?”).
194 See supra Section I.D.
195 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018).
192
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national requirement. 196 While the Court’s decision in Murphy reinvigorated
the conversation about the mechanics of federalism and expanded the
anticommandeering doctrine, it does little to protect California against the
revocation of its preemption waiver. The revocation would translate to a
federal command that California forbear from regulating—ostensibly an
action now subject to a commandeering analysis according to Murphy. Yet
even with Murphy’s stricter commandeering prohibition, the broad
preemption power allows the Act to escape all Tenth Amendment concerns.
This Part begins by applying Murphy to the Clean Air Act and
determining that while the EPA’s revocation of California’s waiver may
raise federalism concerns, Murphy is of no help to California’s case because
preemption remains available as a trump card to any commandeering
challenge. Using the revocation of California’s waiver as an illustration, this
Part then argues that Murphy’s clarified distinction between preemption and
commandeering is too imprecise and formalist to account for modern
cooperative federalism programs. Finally, it concludes by counseling
hesitation before Congress or the courts throw out the delicate balance of the
existing system.
A. Applying Murphy to the California Waiver Revocation
As noted above, a majority of the Clean Air Act only conditionally
preempts state air pollution regulation. 197 For example, the EPA sets national
standards for stationary sources of pollution such as factories, power plants,
and oil refineries, but invites states to prepare individual state
implementation plans that meet the federal criteria. 198 States are free to
impose more stringent pollution limitations on certain polluters, and only if
a state fails to submit a sufficient plan of its own may the EPA require the
state to adopt the federal implementation plan.199 This conditional
preemption scheme avoids a commandeering problem by giving states a
choice between enacting state plans that conform to the federal program or
having state air pollution regulation preempted by federal law. 200

196 See Complaint, California v. Chao, supra note 14 (challenging the Trump Administration’s
rescission of California’s waiver as unlawful); see also Press Release, Attorney General Becerra Files
Lawsuit Challenging Trump Administration’s Attempt to Trample California’s Authority to Maintain
Longstanding Clean Car Standards (Sept. 20, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorneygeneral-becerra-files-lawsuit-challenging-trump-administration%E2%80%99s [https://perma.cc/N3EVESYK].
197 See supra note 146.
198 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2012).
199 See id. §§ 7410(c)(1), 7416.
200 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1676.
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Vehicle emissions are treated differently, however, with the Act
imposing unitary federal choice ceiling preemption on all states and
providing a presumed waiver for California. This particular provision
explicitly prohibits any state from adopting “any standard relating to the
control of emissions from new motor vehicles.” 201 Under Murphy’s refined
definition of commandeering—violation of the principle that Congress
cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—the Clean Air Act’s
proscription of any state regulation is an express federal prohibition of state
action that, under Murphy, is now subject to the anticommandeering
doctrine. 202
The analysis in Murphy did not stop at this first step, however. The
Court progressed to consider whether PASPA could be saved as a valid form
of preemption. 203 Under the Court’s preemption test, judges must consider
whether a law is “best read” to primarily regulate states or private parties.204
In Murphy, the Court concluded that PASPA’s anti-authorization
provision 205 primarily regulated states by prohibiting the legalization of
sports gambling 206—notwithstanding that PASPA ultimately regulated
individuals by prohibiting the act of sports wagering, albeit indirectly. In
asking whether PASPA primarily regulated states or private parties, the
Court only looked at PASPA’s anti-authorization provision but did not
discuss how PASPA’s second, parallel provision 207 directly prohibited
private actors from operating or promoting sports gambling schemes. 208
Therefore, one could take Murphy’s application of the preemption test to
instruct courts to evaluate provisions independently and not within the
broader context of the statute.
Under that approach, courts could review the Clean Air Act’s
preemption provision—which directs that “[n]o State . . . shall adopt or
attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles” and “[n]o State shall require certification, inspection, or any
other approval relating to the control of emissions from any new motor
vehicle”—and conclude that it is best read to regulate states, not private

201

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1467 (2018).
203 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
204 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479; see supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
205 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2000), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461; see also supra notes 86–87
and accompanying text.
206 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481.
207 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2000), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461; see also supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
208 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484; see also Melone, supra note 122, at 446.
202
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actors. 209 This result would compel a court to strike down the Clean Air Act’s
prohibition of state regulation altogether as a form of commandeering and
not a valid form of preemption, making it unconstitutional for Congress to
prevent fifty different standards for vehicle emissions. But it is inconceivable
that Congress could lack the ability to prohibit states from contradicting a
federal law regulating national commerce, a power vested in the
Constitution, critical to the federal system, and which the Supreme Court has
recognized since the early days of the nation. 210
Looking instead at the Clean Air Act’s vehicle emissions regulation
comprehensively, courts would likely view the regulatory scheme as crafted
to primarily impose requirements on vehicle manufacturers (private
actors), 211 and only secondarily crafted to prohibit states from imposing an
entirely different set of requirements. 212 Section 202 of the Clean Air Act,
which directs the EPA to set emissions standards for new motor vehicles,
represents a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce power, 213 and directly
regulates manufacturers as private actors.214 It both imposes a restriction on
private actors and also confers the right to be free of state regulation in excess
of the federal requirements. 215 Thus, even if the Act does commandeer state
legislatures by instructing that they forbear from any vehicle emissions
regulation, that its focus is regulating private actors renders it a valid exercise
of Congress’s preemption power and therefore exempt from the
commandeering prohibition.
Under this formalist approach to the Tenth Amendment set out in
Murphy, the fact that environmental protection originally fell within state

209

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have [p]ower . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210–11
(1824) (“[T]he framers of our constitution . . . declar[ed] the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws
made in pursuance of it. . . . In every such case [where laws enacted by states interfere with laws of
Congress], the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.”). The Commerce Clause provides the constitutional
basis for a wide range of Congressional acts. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 247.
211 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
212 Id. § 7543.
213 See Sidney Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power
to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1067–78 (1965).
214 See 42 U.S.C. § 7522 (enumerating the prohibitions under the Act, which fall on manufacturers
or individual persons); see also id. § 7524 (imposing civil penalties on persons that violate these
standards).
215 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018) (contrasting PASPA
from the federal alien registration standards at issue in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012),
which “not only impose[d] federal registration obligations on aliens but also confer[red] a federal right
to be free from any other registration requirements”).
210
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police power 216 and that states have long taken the lead in air pollution
regulation 217 is irrelevant. The procedure involved in the revocation is
similarly irrelevant—the fact that California has set independent standards
for the past fifty years, and was granted a waiver of preemption which is now
being revoked, does not make it any more of a case of commandeering.
B. Critiquing the Revised Distinction
The foregoing application demonstrates that Murphy does nothing to
disarm the EPA from revoking California’s waiver. While there may be
procedural issues with the revocation process itself, 218 Congress has the
authority to fully preempt California’s vehicle standards and can therefore
delegate to the EPA an ability to withhold a preemption waiver, subjecting
California to the same preemption rule that applies to other states. This
withdrawal of California’s authority to set emissions standards and a zeroemissions vehicle mandate, while perhaps uncomfortable from a states-rights
perspective, creates no legal Tenth Amendment issue under the Court’s
current precedent.
However, applying Murphy’s distinction between preemption and
commandeering to the vehicle emissions regulatory regime highlights two
reasons to critique Murphy’s formalism: first, it poorly accounts for certain
cooperative federalism schemes, and second, leaving preemption unbounded
as a legal alternative to commandeering renders these federalism protections
a matter of form, not substance.
1. Complex Cooperative Federalism Programs
Murphy’s formalist distinction between preemption and
commandeering fails to address a matter at the core of the Tenth
Amendment: how to effectively manage complex cooperative federalism
regimes that bring the federal and state governments together to control
private conduct. The sections of the Clean Air Act with which this Note is
concerned primarily direct regulation at vehicle manufacturers, permissibly
preempting contrary state regulations. 219 But these provisions also command
the EPA to grant California a waiver of preemption if California meets
certain requirements. 220 In this sense, Congress is speaking directly to
California, inviting the state to participate in the regulatory process.

216
217
218
219
220

See Percival, supra note 142, at 1147.
See Revesz, supra note 143, at 592–93.
See GRAB ET AL., supra note 186, at i.
42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012).
Id. § 7543(b).
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The structure of the Clean Air Act’s waiver provision assumes that
California is entitled to a waiver unless proven otherwise. 221 It explicitly
instructs that the EPA “shall . . . waive application” of the preemption
provision if California determines that its standards are, in the aggregate, at
least as stringent as the federal standards. 222 In order to deny the waiver on
these grounds, the EPA cannot merely disagree with California’s
assessment; it must show that California’s determination is arbitrary and
capricious. 223 The Act identifies two other grounds on which the EPA can
withhold a waiver: if California does not need the standards to meet
compelling conditions, 224 or if California’s standards are inconsistent with
the Act’s procedural and substantive requirements for federal standardsetting. 225 Legislative history also shows that Congress intended California
to enjoy the presumption of entitlement to a waiver of preemption. 226 Thus,
the Clean Air Act invites California to act as a second, technology-forcing
regulator as long as the state meets the above-listed requirements to avoid
the three possible grounds for denial of a waiver.
In this type of system, where Congress engages in a dialogue with state
legislatures and explicitly envisions a cooperative program to regulate third
parties, Murphy’s preemption test of whether a law is “best read” to apply to
states or private actors may return a fuzzy result, since these regulatory laws
are directed at both. For example, both PASPA and the Clean Air Act
constrain both private actors (by proscribing private operation of sports
betting and by imposing emissions limits on manufacturers, respectively)
and states (by prohibiting legalization of sports gambling and prohibiting
independent state emissions standards). 227 The nuance lies in whether a law
more directly regulates states or private actors. 228
The Court in Murphy concluded that PASPA was more accurately
described as a law restraining states from allowing private activity that
Congress found censurable. 229 But at its core, Congress’s aim was not to

221

See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
Id. §§ 7543(b)(1)–(2).
223 Id. § 7543(b)(1)(A).
224 Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B).
225 Id. §§ 7543(b)(1)(C), 7521(a). For further detail on the grounds for withholding a waiver, see
supra note 152 and accompanying text.
226 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
227 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2000) (PASPA), invalidated by Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a)(1), 7543(a) (2012) (Clean Air Act).
228 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479–80.
229 Id. at 1481.
222
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control states per se—it was to prohibit individuals from betting on sports. 230
If Murphy’s preemption rule considered the ultimate goal of the federal
regulation, the Court may have found PASPA to primarily regulate private
behavior (sports gambling), and thus be an appropriate form of preemption.
Instead, the Court found the opposite, focusing on the form of the regulation
(directed at state legislatures) rather than the purpose.
Turning to the Clean Air Act, the analysis is murkier. The Act regulates
vehicle manufacturers with the goal of addressing air pollution. 231 But it also
regulates state legislatures with the goal of avoiding a fifty-state approach to
vehicle emissions regulation. 232 In both form and purpose, therefore, the Act
directs regulation at both states and private parties—and applying Murphy’s
preemption test provides little insight on whether the law is an appropriate
form of preemption or not. As this example shows, complex regulatory
programs that involve both the federal government and states regulating third
parties will prove difficult to analyze under the Court’s “best read”
preemption analysis.
2. Misaligned Federalism Concerns
In the case of federal instructions for states to forbear from legislating,
permitting
unbounded
preemption
while
strengthening
the
anticommandeering doctrine is questionable: preemption has the same
impact and similar concerns as commandeering, and the unbounded
availability of preemption as an alternative neutralizes the commandeering
limit.
First, even though Murphy’s clarified preemption test turns on the
identity of the primarily regulated party, the impacts of preemptive and
commandeering laws are the same: in both cases, the federal government
forbids states from independently acting on private parties. In Printz, the
Court recognized that laws directing state executive officials’ actions
infringe upon a state legislature’s ability to manage state policy in the same
way that federal commands directly to state legislatures did in New York.233
Likewise, the Clean Air Act’s ceiling preemption infringes on the California
legislature’s ability to control state environmental policy in much the same
way. Despite Murphy’s attempts to clarify the line between preemption and
commandeering, the results of both appear the same from the ground-level.

230 Id. at 1468–70 (chronicling the history of sports gambling prohibitions and the enactment of
PASPA).
231 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
232 Id. § 7543(a).
233 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
175–76, 188 (1992); Adler, supra note 75, at 398.
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Second, preemption may actually be more harmful to federalism
principles than commandeering. 234 Revoking California’s preemption waiver
completely eliminates California’s ability to participate in any kind of
cooperative scheme with Congress or federal regulators—it removes
California’s seat at the table. Commandeering, at the very least, requires state
involvement and some discretion in implementation of federal programs. 235
In that vein, Professor Neil Siegel cautions that the anticommandeering
prohibition may actually harm state autonomy because when courts strike
down commandeering laws, the federal government often responds with
even broader preemption, shrinking state regulatory power even further. 236
More broadly, preemption leaves a state with no meaningful way to “prevent
federal tyranny, advance political participation, encourage political
responsiveness and accountability through interjurisdictional and
intrajurisdictional competition, express the distinctive value commitments of
the majority of their populations” or “serve as laboratories of
experimentation”—all values at the core of the Tenth Amendment. 237
In sum, Murphy’s modified line between preemption and
commandeering, which turns on the identity of the party primarily being
regulated, is too rigid to account for certain cooperative federalism regimes
that, as the next Section argues, may be normatively preferable to absolute
preemption. Moreover, many scholars have urged that the commandeering
doctrine must be strengthened against preemption if it is to mean anything at
all. 238 Instead, while expanding the anticommandeering doctrine in name,
234

Siegel, supra note 25, at 1646.
Caminker, supra note 25, 1002–03.
236 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1646 (footnote omitted) (“[P]reemption, an obvious and constitutional
alternative to commandeering, may impede the vindication of federalism values not only by raising
accountability problems of its own, but also by reducing the regulatory roles of the states at the level of
policy implementation.”).
237 Id. at 1651.
238 See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 112, at 106 (“[T]he constitutional permissibility of conditional
spending and conditional preemption threatens to make the anticommandeering rule of Printz and New
York a practical nullity.”); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 426 (1998) (“The Court [in New York] essentially assumes
that the greater power to deny funds or preempt entirely includes the lesser power to fund or preempt
conditionally. The Court likewise notes and appears prepared to tolerate more subtle insults to the states’
[sovereignty]. . . . To the extent that the Court’s federalism doctrine is not a mere formality, it appears
that the Court is at once overly protective of, and callously indifferent to, the states’ freedom of action.
But if the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering principle does not actually protect states’ rights to set and
execute their own agendas, what is it designed to do?”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 813, 921 (1998) (“If there are no limits on Congress’s power to use conditional preemption, then
New York is a meaningless formality, because the national government could always require that state
and local governments either make policy according to federal standards or disband themselves.”); Siegel,
supra note 25, at 1673 (“The Rehnquist Court’s apparent lack of concern for the impact of broad federal
235
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Murphy leaves preemption untouched and therefore should not be read to
herald protection of state sovereignty.
C. Cautioning Against Broad Preemption in Vehicle Emissions Regulation
This Note does not purport to advocate for a watershed reading of the
Tenth Amendment that removes preemption as an alternative and returns to
protect some core area of traditional state activities (a concept rejected in
Garcia). 239 That debate is a much larger topic involving serious
consequences beyond the scope of this discussion. 240 It suffices to
acknowledge that California should take no comfort from the idea that
Murphy signals that the Court is more sensitive to protecting a state’s ability
to control state policy. As long as the validity of a preemptive law turns
solely on whether the broader scheme is best read to primarily regulate
private conduct, the Tenth Amendment is inapplicable to protect California
against the waiver revocation.
But even if federalism arguments about the EPA’s revocation of
California’s waiver are unlikely to persuade a court under current precedent,
there are strong normative reasons to counsel against broad ceiling
preemption in environmental regulation. The Clean Air Act’s ceiling
preemption strips states of the ability to drive innovation and respond to local
needs, and it eliminates the national benefits that come from decentralized
policy experimentation. Moreover, the traditional justifications for ceiling
preemption are weaker in the context of vehicle emissions regulation.
1.

Benefits of Joint Federal–State Approaches to
Environmental Policy
There are compelling reasons to allow state participation in
environmental regulation. As discussed earlier, states took the lead in air
pollution regulation decades before the federal government stepped in, and
even after implementation of the Clean Air Act, states continued to drive
technological innovation ahead of the federal government. 241 Studies have
preemption on state regulatory control in the commandeering context is hardly sui generis. It is one of
the puzzles of that Court’s legacy that the same Justices who wrote passionately about the virtues of
federalism seemed somewhat tone deaf to the implications of broad federal preemption for the vindication
of a substantive vision of state autonomy.”).
239 See supra note 45.
240 As Professor Siegel notes, if the Court were to “remove preemption as a constitutional
alternative,” it would “radically transform[] the constitutional regime in which we live.” Siegel, supra
note 25, at 1673, 1675.
241 See supra Section II.B; see also Revesz, supra note 143, at 579, 592 (discussing the early history
of municipality regulation of air pollution in the 1880s and pioneering state initiatives to increase
stringency that far outpaced federal efforts). As Professor Revesz notes, “the states, not the federal
government, produced the most innovation in pollution control legislation in the 1990s.” Id. at 636.
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also shown that state regulations were more effective than their federal
counterparts, 242 perhaps because states may be less susceptible to industry
pressure. 243 Aside from this historic role, state-driven policy change is more
responsive to citizens. 244 The leading role of federal agencies like the EPA in
managing environmental policy means that it is all the more difficult for
individuals to petition for policy changes through traditional political
channels of elected officials. Professor Bulman-Pozen has commended how
states can productively intervene in national policymaking by setting
domestic state policy to challenge federal agency decisions. 245 In that vein,
California can productively intervene in national environmental regulation
by serving as a check on the federal agencies, drawing a productive contrast
in approaches and encouraging those agencies to either adopt a similar
position or explain to the public why they have not done so.
The unique structure of the Clean Air Act’s waiver provision, which
allows at most one additional standard (set by California) beyond the federal
minimum, 246 provides the preceding benefits without imposing the unwieldy
problem of permitting each state to set its own standard. 247 Professor Ann
Carlson describes such a system as a form of “modified federalism,” where
“the federal government establishes innovative relationships with one or
several states, rather than relying on the standard cooperative federalism
arrangement” with all states. 248 As argued below, ceiling preemption is often
not appropriate or necessary in environmental regulation, which might lead
to a conclusion that all states should have the authority to establish emissions
requirements that comply with a federal minimum but better meet the
economic and environmental needs of the state. 249 The practical realities,
however, make this politically and economically infeasible—to require

242

See id. at 580–81. Specifically, three studies found that pollution levels dropped significantly
more under state regulations in the 1960s than under the subsequent federal Clean Air Act. Id. Professor
Revesz notes that this outcome may be misleading because “the first reduction in pollutant levels may
have been easier to achieve than subsequent reductions,” but remarks that at the very least, these studies
show that state regulations were highly effective at reducing pollution levels even in the absence of federal
regulation. Id. at 581.
243 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 310 (“[S]everal scholars have noted that environmental issues often
become ‘federalized’ in part at the behest of industry. Industry representatives want national standards
not only when they fear they will face multiple standards from the fifty states, but also, scholars contend,
when they fear more progressive state legislation.”).
244 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 109, at 2051.
245 Id.
246 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012); supra notes 21, 159 and accompanying text.
247 Dwyer, supra note 147, at 1195 (describing Congress’s fears that automobile manufacturers
might face up to fifty different standards).
248 Carlson, supra note 4, at 285, 313.
249 See infra Section III.C.2.
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national manufacturers to meet up to fifty separate standards would
significantly increase the cost of production and likely result in
manufacturers building cars to meet the most stringent of state
requirements. 250 Balancing benefits against costs, the current system with
two regulators, rather than fifty or the singular federal government, might be
the best structure for the time being. 251 Compared to a “scattershot approach”
where all states could impose more stringent regulations, the two-regulator
system concentrates research efforts, centralizes technological innovation,
spurs the bureaucratic expertise of state agencies, and leads to more
ambitious environmental regulation, while still providing regulatory
certainty to vehicle manufacturers. 252
California has used its “superregulator” status to drive climate policy at
the federal level, a prime example of the values of iterative federalism where
the superregulator state and the federal government spur one another toward
progress that likely would not occur otherwise. 253 Given the benefits of the
existing dual-regulator system, Congress and the courts should be wary of
discarding this delicate balance.
2. Unsuitability of Absolute Ceiling Preemption
Regulatory ceiling preemption is of particular concern and should
require stronger justification in the environmental context. There certainly
are good reasons for setting national standards, 254 but the arguments that
support floor preemption do not necessarily extend to ceiling preemption
schemes like the vehicle emissions regime.
250 Carlson, supra note 4, at 314, 317 (“The prospect of fifty separate standards for automobiles is
untenable.”); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Charles H. Haake, Cars, Carbon, and Climate Change,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 665, 682 n.101 (2008) (noting that designing and manufacturing vehicles for specific
state requirements “entails considerable sunk costs in the form of research and development, and it is
therefore inefficient for manufacturers to produce such vehicles only for discrete markets”). Indeed, one
primary justification for enacting the Clean Air Act was to avoid creating inefficiencies in vehicle markets
if every state was responsible for setting its own emissions limits. COMM. ON STATE PRACTICES IN
SETTING MOBILE SOURCE EMISSIONS STANDARDS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL
STANDARDS FOR MOBILE-SOURCE EMISSIONS 2 (2006); see also Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra, at 676.
251 As Professor Carlson notes, “[t]he debates about federalism tend to view each of the fifty states
as identical—either all fifty states are regulating on their own, or they are enlisted as a group to assist the
federal government in implementing federal law. Yet the fifty states obviously differ in significant
respects. Only a few possess the economic size, population, and regulatory sophistication of California,
and only a few, therefore, have the capacity to participate in modified federalism.” Carlson, supra note
4, at 318.
252 See id. at 315–16.
253 See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1107,
1134 (2009) (deeming California a “superregulator”).
254 See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1590–91 (describing the arguments for
a unitary federal standard). For an argument that the regulation of greenhouse gases specifically should
remain exclusively with the federal government, see Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 250, at 679–85.
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As Professors Glicksman and Levy note, in environmental regulation,
floor preemption commonly prohibits states from setting lower standards
than the federal requirements, which would clearly constitute a conflict
under the Supremacy Clause. 255 But in the case of state standards that are
more stringent than the federal requirement, “the more protective state law
would not hinder the enforcement of the federal standard and would appear
to further the environmental goals of the federal law.” 256 Environmental
protection goals, however, are not the sole consideration when setting federal
standards, 257 and significantly stricter state laws could indeed frustrate the
federal scheme because a unitary federal standard is itself part of the policy
approach. 258
Moreover, courts have been generally deferential to Congress’s
determination to preempt, and when Congress includes an express
preemption provision, courts have not been keen to question whether such a
provision is really justified under the Supremacy Clause. 259 Thus, an
argument that ceiling preemption of state vehicle emissions regulation is not
justified under the Supremacy Clause is unlikely to succeed. Yet, as noted
above, there is value in permitting policy and technological experimentation
by one state as a matter of Congress’s discretion to not apply ceiling
preemption. 260 As Justice Brandeis cautioned in his oft-quoted dissent from
New State Ice Company v. Liebmann:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 261

255 Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption
by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579,
583 (2008).
256 Id.
257 The EPA, for example, must also consider what is technologically feasible, and Congress, of
course, must consider what is politically palatable. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(5)(B) (2012).
258 A critical component of the 2009 compromise between the Obama Administration, the state of
California, and the major American automakers was that there be a single regulator and a harmonized
national standard. Mary Beth Houlihan, et al., Commentary, 2009: A Year of Significant CAA
Developments on All Fronts, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10250, 10252 (2010).
259 See Gregory M. Dickinson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 667, 699
(2011) (“Where Congress has spoken through an express preemption clause, concerns of federalism,
expertise, and self-aggrandizement are outweighed by Congress’s expressed intent and Chevron’s
rationale of agency delegation.”).
260 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 311.
261 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Several scholars have written thoughtful analyses of the traditional
justifications for uniform federal standards and why these justifications do
not support ceiling preemption in environmental regulation. Specifically,
they have critiqued four primary arguments for uniform federal standards as
they apply to environmental regulation: capitalizing on economies of scale,
avoiding a states’ race to the bottom, reducing interstate externalities, and
providing regulatory certainty to industry. 262
The first argument is that it is cheaper and more efficient for one unitary
actor to conduct scientific analyses, determine the optimal level of
regulation, and administer one uniform set of standards, rather than having
fifty separate agencies conducting research and setting unique standards. 263
The structure of the Clean Air Act, however, makes the latter outcome
impossible, as it at most allows two regulators: the federal government and
the state of California. 264
Second, proponents of unitary federal standards worry that states will
otherwise engage in a race to the bottom, in which states lower their
environmental standards to lure businesses and cut costs, causing other states
to do the same. 265 This concern is alleviated by a federal floor, which limits
the bottom to which states may race. However, the race to the bottom concern
lends no support for federal ceilings in environmental regulation—states can
set more stringent environmental standards if they so choose, fully aware that
it might cause economic costs in the form of lost business within the state. 266
A third justification for centralized federal regulation is that it protects
interstate relations and trade by prohibiting protectionist state policies and
cost externalization. 267 The concern is that a state may adopt regulatory
approaches that provide environmental benefits for its own citizens or give
a competitive advantage to in-state industry while externalizing costs to other
states. But similar to the foregoing concerns, protectionism is less of a
problem in the Act’s dual-regulator system. 268 California’s vehicle emissions
standards do not benefit in-state manufacturers or externalize all regulatory
262 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 4, at 317. See generally Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra
note 20, at 1600–13 (explaining factors that influence the decision to adopt a uniform federal standard
through federal preemption).
263 See James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System—
And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1230 (1995); Revesz, supra note 143, at 578, 582.
264 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 311.
265 See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Illusion of Devolution in Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1003,
1005 (2006).
266 See id.; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 255, at 604, 606.
267 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 255, at 603–04.
268 See Burgess, supra note 82 (arguing that cost externalization is not a legitimate or sufficient
justification for ceiling preemption in environmental laws).
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costs—rather, they evenhandedly impose costs on both in-state and out-ofstate manufacturers and consumers who purchase cars in California. There
undoubtedly are some externalized costs to consumers outside of California
in the marginal increase in vehicle cost that results from reduced economies
of scale in vehicle production (when manufacturers must meet two standards
rather than one), but California consumers bear the greatest brunt of these
costs as they must purchase lower-emissions, higher-cost cars than the
national market, indicating that it is not a protectionist policy. 269
The last argument for a unitary federal standard—providing regulatory
certainty to industry—does apply to vehicle emissions, as the automotive
industry unsurprisingly prefers to abide by one, lower national standard. 270
But, as Professor Buzbee notes, “the actual federal track record has been one
of backpedaling and half measures,” and for “high-volume, widely marketed
products like cars, allowing at least the limited diversity of two approaches
could serve as an incentive for innovation and an antidote to inertia and
outdated or lax regulation.” 271 Moreover, California’s separate standard may
itself be a source of regulatory certainty when the federal standards oscillate
with presidential administrations,272 perhaps evidenced by the fact that some
vehicle manufacturers are now voluntarily adhering to California’s
requirements while the enforceability of the SAFE Rule remains uncertain.273
Thus, the traditional justifications for unitary federal standards do not
sufficiently necessitate a ceiling for vehicle emissions regulations. As
Professor Buzbee summarized, “the GHG and climate-change problem is
one particularly well suited to federal floors and not to unitary federal choice
ceilings,” and “floor preemption’s institutional diversity may create a better
chance of success.” 274
CONCLUSION
California will continue fighting for the ability to maintain its more
stringent vehicle emissions standards, particularly as the federal standards
roll back. With the EPA’s issuance of part one of the SAFE Rule in final
form, 275 litigation is moving forward to challenge the revocation California’s
269

See Revesz, supra note 143, at 593.
Carlson, supra note 4, at 310.
271 Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1617–19.
272 See supra Sections II.B–II.C.
273 David Shepardson, U.S. Moving to Block California Vehicle Emissions Rule, REUTERS (Sept. 5,
2019, 11:07 A.M.), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-emissions-california/us-moving-to-blockcalifornia-vehicle-emissions-rules-idUSKCN1VQ24M [https://perma.cc/XCR2-PPC8].
274 Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 20, at 1592, 1618.
275 The SAFE Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533).
270
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waiver. 276 Car manufacturers are also choosing sides: Ford, BMW, Honda,
and Volkswagen agreed to a deal with California to comply with the more
stringent, pre-rollback standards with a one year delay extending to 2026,277
while General Motors, Fiat Chrysler, and Toyota agreed to intervene on
behalf of the Trump Administration. 278 While most of the legal battle going
forward will likely focus on the procedural sufficiency and substantive
merits of the standards freeze and waiver revocation, there is also an
important opportunity to consider this conflict as a study in federalism.
Under the Court’s current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence postMurphy, which leaves preemption as an exception to the anticommandeering
prohibition, it is unlikely that California can invoke federalism arguments to
challenge the loss of its ability to set more stringent standards. But Murphy’s
dividing line between permissible preemption and unconstitutional
commandeering may not be satisfactory for complex cooperative federalism
regimes like the Clean Air Act, where Congress deliberately offers states a
role to participate in jointly regulating private actors.
Aside from constitutional limits, the system of having two regulators
has worked well for the last fifty years, spurring immense technological
innovation and significantly reducing pollution and GHG emissions.279
Recognizing the traditional role that California has played as a laboratory of
democracy driving environmental protection, vehicle emissions regulation
may be the very area where inviting dual, cooperative regulation, not ceiling
preemption, makes sense.

276

Complaint, California v. Chao, supra note 14.
Tom Krisher & Ellen Knickmeyer, Calif. Skirts Trump, Signs Mileage Deal with 4 Automakers,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 25, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/38cd5233db384285adb6a38bd3b58de0
[https://perma.cc/BMS7-9DDU].
278 Hiroko Tabuchi, General Motors Sides with Trump in Emissions Fight, Splitting the Industry,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/climate/general-motors-californiaemissions-trump.html [https://perma.cc/79RF-SNYM].
279 See May, supra note 22, at 472.
277
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